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adopted by Parliament in 1993, provided for the  liquidation of state enterprises, which is almost entirely
resolution of problem loans through workouts,  controlled by debtors. This process is much slower than
liquidation, or loan sales. Here Gray and Holle examine  bankruptcy, and although on paper it is designed for
how formal "exit" processes (rhe movement of labor and  solvent firms, it is often used to get around bankruptcy
assets out of one organization into another or into  and keep debtor management in control of assets for as
unemployment) work in Poland.  long as possible. The "loophole"  of state-enterprise
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enterprises - and touch briefly on the alternatives of  eliminated altogether,  because it invites abuse.
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systems of collateral and debt collection. Suggested  thereby create a moral hazard that could stall further
improvements in design need to be complemented by  restructuring.
strong economic policies that give banks and other
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mechanisms.
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Bankruptcy and its Alternatives
A change in incentives and risks faced by enterprises and their managers lies at
the heart of the transition in former socialist economies.  Financial discipline needs to
replace soft budget constraints, and the entry of new competitors and exit of loss-making
firms needs to become the rule rather than the exception. Only through financial
discipline can product and capital markets impose financial discipline on managers, and
only through "entry" and "exit" can markets select the most efficient producers.
The goal of this paper is to examine how formal "exit" processes work in Poland,
a country at the forefront of the move from plan to market.  "Exit", as used in this paper,
refers to the movement of labor and assets out of an organization into another or into
unemployment.  This concept of exit encompasses both downsizing and closure of an
enterprise.I  A thorough study of exit processes should not look only at firms that exit,
but also at those that do not.  Indeed, one issue we examine is how Polish firms slated for
downsizing or closure differ from those selected -- by the market or by administrative or
political  mechanisms -- for survival.
Our study of exit processes is part of a larger study on a far-reaching program of
bank and enterprise reform adopted by the Polish government in 1993, the "Enterprise
and Bank Restructuring Program" ("EBRP"). 2 The goals of the EBRP were to
rehabilitate and lay the groundwork for privatizing seven of the nine commercial banks
that had been created out of the National Bank of Poland in 1989 and to restructure and
privatize, under the banks' command, a group of financially troubled state enterprises.  It
required the banks to establish workout units and to take action by March 1994 to recover
loans classified as doubtful or loss as of end- 1  991 (the so-called "base portfolio").  Five
"resolution paths" were stipulated in the law.  By the end of March 1994 (later extended
to end-April), each bank was required to take action so that for each firm with a loan in
the base portfolio either:
- the debtor had been fully servicing its debt for at least the last three months;
- a court or bank conciliation agreement had been concluded;
- the debtor had been declared bankrupt;
- liquidation had been initiated under the Privatization Law (i.e. privatization is
pending) or under the law on SOEs (i.e. the enterprise is being shut down) ; or
- the debt had been sold on the fledgling secondary debt market.
Balcerowicz, Gray, and Hashi (1996).
2  For a more in-depth  description  of the EBRP,  see Gray and Holle  (1996).2
The first path, a return to debt service, was the only one that did not envision
any exit and was intended essentially for healthy firms.  The second, court or bank
conciliation, was intended for potentially viable firms that could be successfully
restructured through one of these two formal workout processes.  Court conciliation
was a little-used workout process in existence since 1934.  Bank conciliation was a new
and more flexible bank-led workout process introduced by the EBRP, to be available to
banks and ailing firms for three years.  The last path, sale of the problem loans on the
secondary market, was intended to foster the transfer of the debt to parties with a
greater willingness or ability to put pressure on the firm to repay.3
The two remaining resolution paths were more focused on exit than on
restructuring.  The third path, bankruptcy under Poland's  1934 bankruptcy law,
envisioned the closure of the troubled firm under the direction of the court,  and the
distribution of its remaining assets to creditors. In theory, the firms in the worst
financial state -- that is, those with debts exceeding assets and with liquidation value
higher than value as a going concern -- should enter bankruptcy. The fourth path,
liquidation, differed from the third in that it was supposed to be available only to
solvent firms (those whose assets exceeded their debts).  Liquidation under the
privatization law was merely a form of ownership change, while liquidation under the
state enterprise law envisioned closure of the firm under the direction of the founding
body.
We examine below three fornal workout and liquidation paths laid out in the
EBRP -- court conciliation, bankruptcy, and state enterprise liquidation.  This paper does
not look at bank conciliation in detail; because of its innovative design and wide acclaim.
it is the subject of a separate paper.  4  We also look briefly at the two other paths in the
EBRP, repayment and sale of debt.
Sample Distribution: Resolution Paths and Banks
This paper is based on a survey of 77 firms that went through at least one of these
five resolution paths -- court conciliation, bankruptcy, state enterprise liquidation,
repayment, and sale of debt.  These 77 firms are part of a  larger stratified sample of 139
firms drawn from the universe of firms with debts to the banks larger than PZL I billion
classified (based on the results of a 1992 audit of the banks) as doubtful or loss as of year-
end 1991.5 In the case of the seven banks that remained in state hands, this is the
It was  possible  for firms to go through  more than one resolution  path.  A firm could, for example,  go
from state enterprise liquidation  into bankruptcy,  or from court conciliation  into bank conciliation  (but
not vice versa), and possible  then into bankruptcy  or liquidation.
4Gray  and Holle (  1996)
5 The other 62 firms in  the 139-firm  sample  went through  bank conciliation.  For a description  of the origin
-- both date and type -- of the debts of the 139  firms  to the banks,  see Gray and Holle (1996).3
universe of firns  and debts -- the latter defined as the "base portfolio" -- covered by the
EBRP.  For Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy (WBK) and Bank Slaski, the two banks
slated for early privatization, the names of firms or the size of the overall bad loan
portfolio was not available to the authors.  For the seven state-owned commercial banks,
the base portfolio included 787 firms with loans totaling about PZL 16 trillion, or
US$1.43 billion.
The overall sample of 139 firms includes 130 firms from the seven state-owned
banks and 9 from the two privatized banks.  The sample of 130 constituted about 17
percent of the total number of firms in the base portfolio of the state-owned banks.  It was
stratified to include some firms from each bank and at least 10 firms in each resolution
path, with a special concentration on bank-led conciliation cases.  Cooperatives,
companies in the defense industry, and a few intensely political cases were excluded from
the sample.  To the extent possible, cases were drawn at random subject to these criteria. 6
Because it is difficult to find data and interview subjects in cases of completed
bankruptcies and liquidation cases, our sample for these two resolution paths is composed
primarily of cases that are still ongoing.7
The 787 firms in the base portfolio of the seven state-owned banks and the final
sanple  of 139 firms are broken down by resolution path as shown in Table 1. We
oversampled for bank conciliation cases (in terms of number, but not in terms of amount
of bank debt8) because we wanted to study that process in depth.  We undersampled for
good clients, which are by far the largest EBRP group in terms of numbers.  The
percentage of cases in our sample from other resolution paths is similar to the overall
percentage in the EBRP universe.
6  The selection  was random  in 6 banks  for which  the authors  had access  to a complete  list  of their base
portfolios.  The other state-owned  commercial  bank and one privatized  bank chose  the sample. The other
privatized  bank did not cooperate  in the study.
7It  is not clear  a priori  whether  the selection  of primarily  ongoing  cases creates  a bias,  and, if so, whether
the bias is toward  better  or worse firms. We believe  there is not likely  to be a strong  bias either  way.
s If measured  in size of bank debt,  the bank conciliation  sample  is representative.  Firms  in the bank
conciliation  process  owed  46 percent  of the debt to banks  in the base  portfolio.4
Table 1:  The 139-Firm Sample by Resolution Path
Share of 787  Number of  Share of  Number of banks
enterprises in  enterprises  sample  from which cases
Resolution path:  "base portfolio"  in sample  were taken
Repayment / good  40%  22  16%  6
clients 9
Bank Conciliation  23%  62  45%  8
Court Conciliation  2%  10  7%  4
Sale of Debt  8%  10  7%  7
Liquidation  5%  12  9%  5
Bankruptcy  17%  23  17%  8
Other  5%  0  0%
With regard to bank coverage, cases in all resolution paths were taken from at
least 4 banks to try to get as broad and representative a view as possible of the EBRP
program in Poland.  However, there was some concentration in certain banks that were
more cooperative than others.  The breakdown by bank of the 139-firm sample, the 22
firms that repaid or became current on their loans, the 62 conciliation cases, and the 55
cases in other resolution paths is shown in Table 2.  Six banks are well-represented in the
139-firm sample; from 14 to 32 cases were drawn from each (representing from 12 to 46
percent of their total EBRP cases).  Three banks are clearly underrepresented, with only
6, 2, and 1 cases, respectively.
9There  are three  different  groups  of debtors  in this category: Some  debtors  had not been late on their
payments  before 1992,  but were categorized  as bad debtors  in order  to increase  the amount  of the
recapitalization.  Another  group  paid their debt back  in full, and a third became  current  on their payments.5
Table 2: Distribution of Base Portfolio (787) and Sample (139)
Financial  Number of  Number of  Number of  Number of  Number of
condition*  enterprises  enterprises  enterprises  enterprises  enterprises
in base  surveyed  that repaid or  in bank  in other
portfolio  became  conciliation  resolution
current  paths
Bank I  weak  72  14  1  7  6
Bank 2  adequate/strong*  111  32  3  18  11
Bank 3  strong  146  6  0  5  1
Bank 4  strong  N.A.  14  3  8  3
Bank 5  weak  69  32  6  11  15
Bank 6  strong  100  2  0  2  0
Bank 7  strong  131  19  4  3  12
Bank 8  weak/adequate*  158  19  5  8  6
Bank 9  strong  N.A.  1  0  0  1
Total  787  139  22  62  55
*Banks  2 and 8 are in  the middle  in our consolidated  measure  of financial  condition. Banks  2, the stronger
of the two (with a much higher  capital  ratio and more  improvement  in its capital  position  and loan
portfolio),  has been classified  with  the strong  banks  for purposes  of our  analysis. Bank 8 (which  had an
extremely  high level of bad debts in 1991)  has  been classified  with  the weak  banks.
Table 2 also categorizes the 9 banks into two groups, based on their financial
condition in 1993 when final decisions were taken on the resolution paths of most base
loans and when conciliation agreements began to be negotiated.  Our sample of 77 cases
in paths other than bank conciliation is divided approximately equally between weaker
and stronger banks.  Our assessment of financial condition is based on four indicators:
(1) risk-weighted capital adequacy in 1993 (when the agreements were being negotiated),
(2) change in risk-weighted capital adequacy 1991-93, (3) percentage of the 1991 loan
portfolio rated doubtful or loss, (4) change in percentage of loan portfolio rated doubtful
or loss 1991-93 (see Appendix 1). In our view, those banks which had adequate capital in
1993 or a relatively smaller 1991 bad loan portfolio to be worked out, or which had
already shown an ability to improve either or both, were better placed to tackle the work-
out effort successfully. The two privatized banks were automatically included in the
"strong" category.  They were the first banks to be privatized both because their situation
in 1991 was clearly better than that of the other banks and because they were viewed to
have better risk assessment and bad loan workout skills.
We would like to emphasize that the assessment of a bank as "strong" or "weak"
does not necessarily reflect the quality of its management. The regional allocation of
portfolios to banks made risk spreading particularly difficult for bank managers.  The
various banks inherited portfolios of differing qualities and clients with diverse futures,
and they operated in regional economies with varying growth potentials.  In the words of6
one bank manager: "A commercial bank with a substantial loan portfolio can only be as
good as the financial standing of its clients."
Characteristics of Sample Firms
Sectoral Distribution.
Overall the decision for a firm to enter bank conciliation or one of the other
resolution paths does not appear to have been heavily affected by the sector in which it
operates.  Figure 1 shows a breakdown of the 139-firm sample into three broad
groupings: the 62 that entered bank conciliation, the 22 that repaid or became current on
their debt, and the 55 that entered other resolution paths. While there is a significant
concentration of all three among two broad sector groupings -- textiles and machinery
and equipment, all sector groupings have firms in each samples. Bank conciliation is
somewhat more common for firms in machinery and equipment and somewhat less
common for firms in metals and the residual "other" sector category.
Figure 1: Sample distribution among industrial sectors
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Table 3 divides the base portfolio among resolution paths. While only 23 percent
of firms entered bank conciliation, they accounted for 46 percent of the base portfolio.
Enterprises in other resolution paths had far lower levels of bank debt on average --
between PZL9 billion and PZL 17 billion per firm, compared with PZL41 for firms in
bank conciliation.7
Table 3:  Share of Debt by Resolution Path for all 787 EBRP Firms
Share of 787  Share of base  average debt owed
firms  portfolio  to main bank  (end-
Resolution-path  (in number)  (in value)  91) --in bln zl
Repayment / good  40%  20%  15.1
clients
Bank Conciliation  23%  46%  41.1
Court Conciliation  2%  1%  13.8
Sale of Debt  8%  7%  16.8
Liquidation  5%  2%  9.4
Bankruptcy  17%  10%  12.1
Other  5%  4%  13.8
Profitabilitv and Employment.
Figure 2 shows the average operating profits in 1991 and 1992 and the average
number of employees'0 of the firms entering different resolution paths. These two
variables are significant explanatory variables. I  Firms entering bank conciliation were
on average more profitable in 1991-92 (with average operating profits of 1 percent) than
firms in other paths.  Those entering liquidation or bankruptcy were the least profitable,
with average operating profits of -47 and -45 percent, respectively.  Firms entering bank
conciliation also had on average more employees (almost 1300 per firm) than firms in
other paths.  Those entering bankruptcy had the fewest employees (apart from the few
firms whose debt was sold), but had still been quite large in 1991-92, with about 500
employees on average.  In essence, the workout routes appear to have captured firms with
reasonable prospects for successful restructuring and/or those that were large enough to
make a political impact.  This result is encouraging and shows that the process may have
roughly succeeded in separating viable from unviable firms.  However, the fact that firms
in state enterprise liquidation were larger yet on average even more unprofitable than
those in bankruptcy underscores the problems with the former process discussed later in
the paper.
Reasons for Financial Distress
The causes of financial distress in the 62 enterprises entering the bank conciliation
process differed little from those in the 77 enterprises going into different paths.  The
most commonly cited cause of financial distress -- named by almost 9 out of 10 firms in
both groups as one of the 3 most important causes, and by almost one-half as the most
'°  Size of debt is to some extent  a proxy  for size of the firm  and is therefore  correlated  with  number  of
employees.
See  Annex 2 for logistic  regression  results. This  pattern  holds  for both  strong  and weak banks.Figure 2: Average Operating Profitability and Number of Employees 1991 11992
(standard deviation in parentheses)
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important -- was declining domestic consumption of the goods they produced.  Indeed,
total domestic consumption of the major product of the 77 firms declined on average by
more than 40 percent between 1989 and 1991. The second most commonly cited cause,
which affected about one-half of all firms, was an inability to collect receivables.  A
decline in exports to CMEA markets affected about one-third of the firms, and was cited
as the most important cause by one-fifth.  One-quarter to one-third of the firms noted
increased import competition, increasing prices of inputs, or rising tax burdens as
important.
These answers confirm that many of the firms in our sample were severely
affected by the general downturn in the Polish economy in 1990 and 1991, either
suffering a decline in sales themselves or having customers who were unable to pay their
bills.  A smaller but still significant percentage were affected by structural changes
specifically attributable to transition -- including the realignment of prices, increasing
import competition, and declining CMEA exports.  While it is often hard to differentiate
these two factors -- recession vs. transition-related structural change -- in practice, one
might expect those firms citing structural reasons for their financial distress to have a
lower likelihood of eventual recovery. No significant differences in reasons for financial
distress appear to exist, however, between the firms in our sample that entered workout
processes and those that repaid or were slated for closure.
Structure of Enterprise Debt
Figures 3 through 6 give a snapshot of the structure of debt in 73 of the 77 firms
that entered resolution paths other than bank conciliation.12 Although overall debt levels
did not rise substantially in real terms in the early 1990s for firms in most resolution
paths (Figure 3), the size of the debt relative to assets (Figure 4) and the structure of the
debt (Figure 5) both changed dramatically.  As a share of total assets, total debt rose on
average from 65 percent in 1991 to 157 percent in  1994.  Most of this increase reflected
a decline in the real value of assets, due both to shedding of assets and to inadequate
indexing for inflation. 1 3 With regard to the structure of debt, bank debt and payables to
suppliers fell both in real terms and as a share of total debt, while government debt
skyrocketed by both measures.  Taxes and social insurance payables to the government
more than doubled in real terms from 1991 to 1993. As a share of total assets, they
increased from 12 percent in 1991 to 44 percent in 1993. In 16 cases the government (the
tax office and ZUS) replaced banks or suppliers as the largest creditor (Table 4).  At least
70 percent of these payables consisted of overdue tax and social insurance arrears.1 4 The
12 Debt data were unavailable  for the other  4 firms. For detailed  debt data on firms in bank conciliation,
see Gray  and Holle (1996).
13 Revaluation  of assets  during  this period  was allowed  several  times,  with  the extent  of revaluation  being
largely  at the discretion  of firm  management.
14  We do not know the exact breakdown  between  current  and overdue  payables  for all categories  of taxes
for all years.  Of debts to the tax office  and the social  insurance  agency  at year-end 1993,  28 percent of9
structure of debt did not vary dramnatically  among firms in the various resolution paths
other than bank conciliation (Figure 6), although banks were somewhat more prominent
in bankruptcy cases and suppliers were more prominent in court conciliation cases.
Fiure  3: Average  Debt  by Resolution  Path
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payables  were current  and 72 percent  were overdue  (43 percent  for more  than one year). Because
payments  to ZUS were in general  more likely  to be made  than payments  to other  tax agencies, an estimate
that  three-quarters  of tax liabilities  were in arrears  appears  reasonable.10
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Table 4:  Identity of Largest Creditor (66 cases)
1991  1993
Banks  1  9  12
Suppliers  35  22
Tax  5  20
ZUS  0  1
Other  7  1  1
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These trends support the findings of other studies  that indicate that suppliers are
among the first creditors to begin imposing hard budget constraints on firms in transition.
As the suppliers themselves are squeezed by market pressures and cutoffs in subsidies,
they begin to require payment in cash before they ship goods. State-owned banks also
tighten their lending when subject to macroeconomic and market discipline.  The biggest
remaining source of "softness" in firms' budget constraints during the early stages of
reform is likely to be the government, which has great technical and political difficulty
15 See, for example,  Fan and Schaffer  (1993).12
collecting tax and social insurance payments and thereby forcing financial discipline for
problem firms.'6
Court Conciliation
Design of the Process
Court conciliation (sometimes called "arrangement") is a workout process that
dates from 1934. It was adopted simultaneously with the bankruptcy law of that year,
and was designed to provide an alternative to liquidation for ailing firms that were able to
restructure their debts with their creditors and continue in business.  Court conciliation is
a rather inflexible process when compared with more modern reorganization processes in
mature market economies, and the Poles adopted the bank conciliation process in 1993 in
part to avoid the inflexibility of court conciliation. 17A  debtor company can apply for a
court conciliation only if it ceased to pay debt service "due to reasons that are exceptional
and independent of it ... and insolvency is due to circumstances over which [it] had and
could have had no impact."  Workouts under court conciliation exclude secured
creditors and government creditors (such as tax and social security offices), and thus they
cover only trade creditors and bank creditors (to the extent they are not covered by, or
choose to forego, security interests).  Because the procedure was designed to provide debt
relief, the law envisioned only financial terms in the restructuring agreement; operational
conditions  -- such as changes in employment, investment, or management -- were not
expected (although they presumably could be included if all parties agreed). Any
agreement must be approved by a two-thirds majority (in terms of value of claims), or
four-fifths for write-offs greater than 40 percent.  Finally, only parties attending the
proceedings are allowed to vote on the proposed agreement.  It may be difficult for a
debtor with many creditors to assemble the required majority in one place for the vote.
Once the debtor applies for court conciliation, the court must decide within two
weeks whether to proceed.  If it decides to open a case, the judge appoints a "judge-
commissioner" and a "reorganization trustee".  Incumbent management stays in control
of the firm, supervised by the trustee, but must obtain permission from the judge-
commissioner for all business activities outside the normal course.  Secured creditors can
be barred from foreclosing on assets if such foreclosure would hinder reorganization, and
16  The decision  which  creditor  to pay can be an important  one in financially  distressed  companies,
sometimes  handled  exclusively  by the Chief  Executive. A number  of managers  in the survey  expressed
personal  gratitude  to the head  of the local tax office,  whithout  whose  help the enterprise  would  not have
survived.
See Annex 3 for a comparison  of the two processes.
18 Groszek  (1993).  The enterprise  must have  been  operating  for three  years, have  maintained  adequate
bookkeeping,  and have  not been in bankruptcy  or prior conciliation  within  the past five years.13
all creditors are barred from filing for bankruptcy or accepting debt repayments outside of
a conciliation agreement.
The Process in Action.
Court conciliation lay on the books virtually dormant throughout the socialist
period.  It was brought to life in 1990 and filings expanded rapidly in 1991 and 1992.
However, only a small share of applications led to actual conciliation cases, as most were
either rejected by the court or settled out-of-court (Table 5).
Table 5: Applications for Court Conciliation in Poland, 1990-1992
Applications  Considered  Rejected  Otherwise  Procedure
of which:  "dealt with"  opened
1990  2  2  0  1  1
1991  76  24  8  8  8
1992  688  527  73  356  98
Source:  Brol, 1993, p. 63.
Our sample had ten cases of court conciliation.  Of these only two were initiated
before bank conciliation was adopted as an alternative process on February 3, 1993. It is
interesting that court conciliation continued to be used even after bank conciliation
emerged as a feasible alternative. The application for conciliation was filed by the
debtor. It appears that creditor pressure triggered the filing in about one-half of the cases,
while the other half were filed because the debtor hoped to get debt relief or additional
working capital (Table 6).
Table 6: What Triggered Court Conciliation?
(in number of firms)
Most  One of tire
important  three most
reason  important
Attempts or threats by creditors to foreclose on collateral  3  4
Inability of debtor to obtain additional working capital  2  6
Pressure by founding organ to deal with creditors  0  1
Threat by creditor(s) to sell their debt  1  5
Other (debt relief)  3  3
Other (creditor pressure)  I  I
The actual process of conciliation was quite rapid. Our ten cases took on average
about six months from initiation to agreement, and another 19 days for the agreement to14
take effect. Of the cases that were not appealed, court conciliation took only about 15
percent longer than bank conciliation from initiation to effectiveness.'9 This puts into
question the view that court conciliation is necessarily too slow -- a major rationale
behind the adoption of the bank conciliation process.
In almost all cases, two or three creditor groups were formed for purposes of
negotiations.  Small creditors, which held only 2-3 percent of the debt, usually formed a
separate group. In contrast to bank conciliation, small creditors in court conciliations
were more inclined to vote in favor of proposed agreements than large creditors.  While
this might be expected, given that they generally got more favorable treatment, small
creditors did not react similarly in bank conciliations -- perhaps because they distrusted
the objectivity of a process controlled by another creditor.  In only one of our 10 cases
was a creditors' council created to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and in
practice it is unclear who (if anyone) carries out such monitoring.  Although government
claims are not included in court conciliation agreements, seven of our 10 firms negotiated
separate agreements with ZUS (the social security agency).
Financial and Operational Outcomes
What were the outcomes of conciliation in our sample of cases? Our survey was
conducted on average about two years after the agreements were signed; it is possible to
gauge early impacts, although clearly the story is still unfolding in may of these firmns. In
terms of financial restructuring, court conciliations provided only for debt relief -- either
write-offs or reschedulings (Table 7).  There were in practice no debt-equity swaps or
new credits as in some bank conciliations.  Of the two forms of debt relief, court
conciliation agreements had fewer write-offs (on average about 30 percent of debt) than
bank conciliation agreements (on average about 60 percent).  Small creditors received
bigger write-offs than large creditors, but the difference was not as marked as in bank
conciliations.  However, reschedulings in court conciliations were more generous.  On
average they gave a grace period of 6 months for small creditors and 7 months for large
creditors, more than 50 percent longer than under bank conciliation. The rescheduled
loan period was some 2 years for small creditors and 4 1/2 years for large creditors, 100%
and 50% longer, respectively, than in the case of bank conciliations.  Indeed, if one
computes the net present value of the rescheduled loans for all classes of creditors, it
appears that both processes yielded very similar benefits for debtors:  about two-thirds of
their debt was effectively erased in both processes.
19  Our 62 cases  of bank conciliation  took on average 118  days from initiation  to agreement,  and on
average 49 more days until effectiveness because of the need to obtain approval from the Ministry of
Privatization  (Gray and Holle, 1996). In the case of bank conciliation, many agreements were at least
partially negotiated before the process officially began, while this is much less likely to have occurred in
court conciliation.  Thus, it is possible that the two processes were in practice equally rapid.15
Table 7:  Financial Conditions in Court Conciliation Agreements
Weak banks  Strong banks  All banks
#of  % of debt in  #of  % of debt in  # of  % of debt in
Condition  cases  conciliation  cases  conciliation  cases  conciliation
Write-off
-large creditors  6  30%  1  37%  7  31%
-small creditors  6  8%  2  21%  8  12%
-one category  0  1  80%  1  80%
Increase in maturity of debt: # days between when agreement took
effect and:
-large creditors
-first payment  6  340  3  328  9  336
-last payment  6  1780  3  1424  9  1662
-small creditors
-first payment  5  149  3  192  8  165
-last payment  5  777  3  405  8  637
-one category
-first payment  0  1  457  1  457
-last payment  0  1  1188  1  1188
Immediate partial
repayment
-large creditors  0  0  0  0  0  0
-small creditors  1  3%  0  0  1  3%
-one category  0  0  0  0  0  0
Debt-equity swap  0  0  0  0  0  0
Newequity  0  0  0  0  0  0
New bank credit  0  0  0  0  0  0
In contrast to bank conciliation, there is no evidence that enterprises indebted to
weak banks were treated more leniently than those indebted to strong banks.  Indeed, the
opposite was true in our sample, although its size is too small to draw firm conclusions.
Also in contrast to bank conciliation, our regression results point to a significant positive
relationship between the extent of write-offs and two other variables -- the operating
profitability of the firm and its level of indebtedness.20
20 The dependent  variable  Y was the percentage  of total base  portfolio  debt  that was written  off. The best-
fitting  regression  equation  produced  the following  statistics  for three dependent  variables:
parameter est.  t-statistic  P value
E091  (1991 operating profits)  0.390  2.35  .10
DA91  (1991 debt/assets ratio)  0.434  3.45  .04
DUMMY (I=weak  bank)  -.116  -1.90  .15
Two other dependent variables -- number of employees and number of days agreement was reached before
April 30,  1995 -- were insignificant.16
In terms of operational outcomes, the results of our small sample are
disconcerting.  Only in two of the 10 cases does it appear that the rescheduled debt will
be properly serviced. The other eight firms continue to face difficulty in debt service.
Two had subsequently concluded and two more were trying to conclude a bank
conciliation agreement when they were interviewed in mid-1995; of the other four, three
were trying to find other means of debt relief, and in one case bankruptcy proceedings
have begun.  Although reported gross and net profit margins had improved as firms were
allowed to record debt write-offs as income,  average operating profits as a share of
operating revenues of the ten firms had fallen from -8 percent in 1992 and -7 percent in
1993 to -10 percent in 1994. Clearly the performance of most firms had not improved as
a result of the court conciliation. 22
Figure  7: Profit Measures  for  Firms  in Court  Conciliation
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In sum, the court conciliation process is inadequate as currently designed,
primarily because of its inflexibility -- its exclusion of debt to government, its total
emphasis on financial rather than operational restructuring, its high majority voting
requirements (particularly in the case of large write-offs), its requirement that creditors be
present to vote, and other provisions.  But it is not fatally flawed.  In a sample of 10 cases
The same  practice  of recording  write-offs  as income  inflated  profit margins  in firms  subject  to bank
conciliation  as well. See Gray  and Holle  (1996).
22 It should be noted, however, that even in the U.S. some 90 percent of Chapter 11 cases eventually end
up in liquidation.  Saving even ten percent of firms -- and a significantly higher percentage of large firms --
could arguably be viewed as success.17
it worked surprisingly speedily as a debt reduction device, although apparently less
effectively as a restructuring tool.  With amendments in design and greater resources
devoted to monitoring agreements, combined with continued efforts to spur market-
oriented behavior in banks, the court conciliation process could become a reasonable
formal workout process for firms in financial distress.
Bankruptcy
Design of the Process
The Polish bankruptcy process, originally adopted in 1934 and amended in
1990,23  is modeled on prewar European statutes and is designed as a liquidation process
for insolvent firms.24 A creditor, owner, or manager of a firm can petition the court for a
declaration of bankruptcy.25 The judge is generally supposed to open the case if the
petition is complete and if the company has sufficient assets to cover procedural costs. 26
The judge then appoints an official trustee, who takes over management of the firm's
assets.  All debts immediately fall due, and all creditors are asked to file their claims. The
trustee can continue to keep the firm in operation during bankruptcy if needed to
preserve the value of company assets.  The trustee draws up a balance sheet of the
company and publishes a detailed list of debts.  Interest stops accruing, except on secured
debts, once bankruptcy is declared. Most setoffs of claims are no longer allowed, and the
trustee can prohibit any new foreclosures on collateral. The district court sets the level of
remuneration of the trustee, based on a recommendation of the bankruptcy judge.27  The
bankruptcy judge can appoint a creditors' council to help manage and dispose of assets,
and must do so if 20 percent of creditors so request.
23  Regulation of the President of Poland of October 24, 1934 on the Bankruptcy Act as amended, Journal
of Laws No. 14/item 87, 1990.
24 The bankruptcy process does provide the possibility of a conciliation agreement among unsecured
creditors, if priority creditors can be fully satisfied and if the firm submits a financial restructuring plan
approved by two-thirds of these creditors in value of claims and one-half in number agree.  A survey in
1993 found only one instance when such conciliation procedure had been used in the course of bankruptcy.
Brol,  1993.
25  Managers are by law required to file a bankruptcy petition within two weeks from the "debtor's  failure
to pay his debts" or they become personally liable to the creditors for any losses arising from failure to file
(Groszek and Ciesla, 1993). A 1993 study found that this provision was violated regularly, with no
consequences for firm managers (Brol., 1993).  It is unclear whether any attempt has ever been made to
hold a manager liable for failure to petition.
26  The court has significant discretion as to whether or not to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding.  Before
deciding to initiate a case, the court can hold hearings and request testimony from the debtor, creditors, and
other interested parties, and, in the case of state enterprises, from the workers' council, the founding
Ministry, and the State Treasury.  Coates and Mirsky, 1995.
27  Remuneration generally ranges between 2 and 20 times the average salary in Poland per case (Coates
and Mirsky,  1995). The trustee also receives reimbursement for all expenses.18
The law as now designed has several major deficiencies.  First and perhaps
foremost, the priority list discourages any active involvement by non-government
creditors in the bankruptcy process, because it makes it virtually impossible for banks
28 and other creditors to recover anything.  Creditors often express the view that "the
government always comes first. "  In fact, if the government and procedural costs do
not consume the entire estate, it is likely that employees'  claims will.  Second, even
with little expectation of recovery, creditors are asked to pay between 5 and 13 percent
of the value of their debt as advance payment of court fees.29 A third deficiency is that
the law provides few means for a trustee or judge to void fraudulent transactions made
by managers or owners, at the expense of creditors, prior to the bankruptcy filing. 30
Fraudulent transactions are indeed thought to be common, 3'  and the legal system must
find a way to identify and punish them if the bankruptcy process (or indeed any debt
collection process) is to be credible.
The Process in Action
The number of bankruptcy petitions to Polish courts grew steadily in the early
1990s (Figure 8).  Although most petitions were considered by the courts,  it appears
28  The priority  given to secured creditors in bankruptcy is extremely confusing (Baer and Gray,  1996).
The bankruptcy law provides that secured creditors should be satisfied first, but subject to the rules on
priorities  of mortgages and liens laid out in the Polish Code of Civil Procedure.  Pursuant to the Code of
Civil Procedure,  secured creditors come far down in priority, below procedural costs, payments to
employees,  taxes, and rents due on government-owned property.  Furthermore,  the government has an
automatic lien over all property of any party in arrears to the government (for taxes, social security
payments, or customs duties).  This lien need not be written or formalized in any way to have priority.
Since most problem debtors have large arrears to the government, this automatic lien severely impinges
on the security provided by any other liens. Finally, non-bank secured creditors are at an extreme
disadvantage under current Polish law, because all bank loans, whether or not secured, have priority over
other creditors,  even if the latter are secured.
According to the bankruptcy law, once claims secured by collateral are satisfied, the remainder
of the assets (and any excess of proceeds from the sale of secured property over the value of secured
claims) become the bankruptcy estate.  This estate is then used to satisfy creditor claims in the priority
specified in the bankruptcy law itself.  According to this latter bankruptcy-specific priority, bank and
trade creditors come behind (1) the costs of the proceedings (which include all amounts due to the court,
the receiver, and employees for wages,  severance payments, etc.),  (2) taxes, and (3) social security
contributions.
29  Szlezak, 1993.
30 The law provides only that gifts made within 6 months prior  to filing can be voided.  It does not
extend to sales or other types of contracts (even if they contain an element of gift through underpricing).
There  is also a possibility to void fraudulent transactions made prior to filing, but such a process is
extremely difficult to implement because it requires proof of intent to defraud.  Furthermore,  in 1970 a
number of actions, such as purposefully reducing the value of a creditor's  claim by paying back
selectively or not keeping adequate accounting records, were decriminalized, and this makes it more
difficult for judges and trustees to detect and void prior fraudulent actions.
31Brol,  1993; Sak and Schiffman, 1994, Coates and Mirsky, 1995.19
that more than one half were rejected (in most cases because the petitions were
incomplete or assets insufficient to cover costs).  Although most petitions and opened
cases concerned small private firms, a significant number involved state enterprises
(Table 8), either filed directly as bankruptcies or transformed from state enterprise
liquidations or court conciliations.  Given the poor treatment of secured creditors
under priority rules and the requirement for creditors to deposit money for costs up
front,  it is not surprising that about two-thirds of all cases appear to be filed by the
debtor. 32
Figure 8:  Bankruptcy Petitions and Cases by Year, 1990-1995
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32  In 1991  and 1992,  67 and 60 percent  of all cases,  respectively,  were filed by the debtor firmn  itself.
Brol, 1993,  p. 63.20
Table  8: "Exit"  Process  for Polish
State-owned  Enterprises
Bankruptcies (pending or completed as of 3-31-94)  602
Liquidations* (cumulative through end-95)  1,289
Of these:
Completed  332
Converted to bankruptcy  441
Taken over by Rural Property Agency**  51
Pending**  465
* Article 19, State-owned Enterprise Law
Source:  Baer and Gray, 1996; Blasczyzk 1995
The implementation of the law is severely hampered in Poland, as in all
transition settings, by institutional weakness.  The courts are understaffed,
underfunded,  and undertrained,  and they lack support from related professions  --  such
as trustees, accountants, lawyers, bailiffs, investigators, or prosecutors -- that provide
critical information gathering and enforcement functions in more established market
economies.  A 1993 study of 80 bankruptcy petitions found that the proceedings were
begun and completed as expected (with assets being divided among creditors)  in only
15 cases. 33 The other petitions were either rejected (because of incompleteness or lack
of funds to cover costs) or withdrawn.  The study concluded that, while some of the
cases were legitimate instances of economic downturn, many were fraudulent in nature.
Most assets with any value had been sold or otherwise disappeared before the petition
for bankruptcy was filed or considered by the court.  However, investigations of
possible crimes were extremely rare, presumably in large part because of the absence
of resources or information to prosecute cases.
Our 139-firm sample contained 23 enterprises in bankruptcy, which owed debts
to eight of the nine commercial banks.  As noted in Figure 2, these firms were in
considerably worse shape than the other 116 firms, with average operating losses of
nearly 50 percent of sales in 1991 and 1992.  Creditors were not as passive against these
enterprises as against those that later entered bank or court conciliation proceedings.  In
19 of the 23 cases, debt collection actions had already been taken before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.  The date of filing in our sample ranges from June 1991 to April
Brol(1993).21
1994. Eight cases were filed before the EBRP law was adopted on February 3, 1993, and
6 cases were filed in April, 1994, just before the EBRP's extended deadline for dealing
with base portfolio debt.  Four of the 23 had previously been in state enterprise
liquidation.
Our sample is split evenly between filings by the debtor and filings by creditors.
The debtor firm filed in 9 cases and its "founding body" (representing the state treasury
as owner) in three. Five cases were filed by a bank creditor, five by a supplier, and one by
the tax office.  Creditor filings in our sample are much higher than average (see above), in
part because of the linkage of our cases with the EBRP and the requirement that banks
take action to work out bad debts in EBRP firms.
The filing was protested in three cases, twice by the debtor and once by the
founding body.  The filing of a protest does not appear to have held the process up
significantly. On average the court opened the bankruptcy proceeding three months after
the bankruptcy petition was filed; only one case was severely delayed, languishing for 14
and a half months before the court opened the proceeding.  A trustee was appointed in all
cases immediately upon the opening of the proceeding.  In all but one case, the judge
appears to have selected the trustee independently; in one case the choice of trustee may
have been influenced by incumbent management via the "founding body".  The trustee
filed a first report on average after three months and made the first disposition of assets a
few days later.
Only two of the 23 cases had been completed at the time of our survey (on
average more than two years after the court decision to proceed).  Trustees in the other 21
cases were asked how long they expected their cases to take in total.  Two thought their
cases could be completed within 2 years, 11 expected it would take 2-3 years, and 8
thought they needed at least three years. If these expectations are accurate, the average
length of a bankruptcy case would be about three years.  The most commonly cited
reasons for delay were unclear ownership rights -- particularly of real estate (mentioned
by 13 firms), and the lack of buyers for the assets (14 firms).
Financial and Operational Outcomes
Although the phenomenon is much less marked than in Hungary, 34 even in Poland
it appears that bankruptcy-liquidation can be an avenue for enterprise restructuring in
certain cases.  Eighty percent of our sample of firms continued to operate as a going
concern after bankruptcy had been declared, but only for one year on average.  Five of 23
were still in operation when the firms were surveyed in mid-1995. From 1992 to 1994,
those firms had seen sales revenues fall by 14 percent (after accounting for inflation), real
operating profits fall by 78 percent, and employment fall by 38 percent, but wages for
34  Gray, Schlorke,  and Szanyi,  1996.22
remaining employees had risen by 25 percent in real terms.  Three expected improved
operating results in 1995, two even operating profits.  One company in particular did so
well that it settled with its creditors in a bankruptcy conciliation, emerged from
bankruptcy, and is now operating under old management.
A major function of bankruptcy is to transfer control over assets to new agents --
or new private agents in the case of transition economies. Three-quarters of the assets that
had been sold, leased, or transferred by the time of our survey had indeed gone to
unaffiliated private parties.  In 19 of the 23 cases the trustees had attempted to sell all or
part of the firm as a going concern, and it appears that roughiy 40 pcrccn:t  of the fixed
assets of these firms will survive as part of a going concern.
The major losers in Polish bankruptcy are creditors, even secured creditors,
because of the many claimants with higher priority.  The trustees interviewed anticipated
that gross recoveries from asset sales would equal on average about 25 percent of the
value of assets in the opening balance sheet.  A full 80 percent of these recoveries were
expected to be consumed by bankruptcy expenses and severance payments to workers.  In
all but one case employees'  severance claims were expected to be fully satisfied (Table
9).  But banks were expected to receive nothing in 10 cases and be fully compensated in
none.  Suppliers, in the lowest priority class, will recover nothing in three-quarters of all
cases, and on average were expected to recover roughly 7 percent of their claims.
Table 9: Schedule of creditor satisfaction in bankruptcy cases
Percentage of claims satisfied
Lowest creditor group at  Employees  Social  Government  Banks  Suppliers
least partially satisfied:  insurance
Employees (N=1)  70%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Social Security and  100%  32%  25%  0%  0%
Government (N=9)
Banks (N=6)  96%  39%  34%  21%  0%
Suppliers (N=6)  100%  92%  87%  43%  24%
Average percentage of
claims satisfied  98%  49%  43%  17%  7%
Bankruptcy is in theory one mechanism through which control rights over a
firm shift to its creditors in times of financial distress.  As seen in Figure 9, creditors
have more involvement in bankruptcy than in state enterprise liquidation but the level
of involvement is still less than that of debtor management.23
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What do these results say about the workings of the Polish bankruptcy system?
Like court conciliation, it is a flawed but not fatally flawed process.  A change in the
order of priorities is desperately needed to give creditors an incentive to file and
oversee cases.  Fortunately,  a new collateral law that will eliminate the automatic lien
of government and will give secured creditors much higher status is likely to be
adopted soon.  In addition, a major effort is needed to build institutional capacity in the
courts,  the trustee profession, and related investigative and prosecutorial arms of
government,  in order to detect and punish fraud in the bankruptcy process. Poland has
a beginning on which to build, but much remains to be done.
State Enterprise Liquidation
Design of the Process
Article  19 of the Polish State Enterprise law provides for the liquidation of
state-owned companies. 35 Although this law, adopted in 1981, is a legacy of the
socialist legal system, there is no evidence of Article 19 having been used before
transition began in 1990.  Under Article 19, creditors may initiate the liquidation of a
35  This should not be confused with Article 37 of the Privatization Law, which provides a privatization
route called "privatization through liquidation".  Privatization through liquidation is not an exit process in
our meaning of the term and is not included in our study.24
state-owned borrower by petitioning the governmental entity charged with exercising
ownership control (the "founding body"), or the founding body may initiate the
procedure (if they obtain the authorization of the Ministries of Privatisation and
Finance).  The law specifies several criteria that justify (but do not require) a
liquidation filing, including inability to pay the obligatory dividend to the state treasury
and negative after-tax earnings.  Only companies that are still solvent (that is, whose
assets exceed their debts) are in theory eligible for this procedure.  However, many of
the companies in liquidation prove to be insolvent, and many ultimately end up in the
bankruptcy courts.
Liquidation is a process controlled by owners and managers.  The founding
body appoints a trustee charged with drawing up a balance sheet and list of liabilities
and selling off the assets in whole or part.  There are no restrictions on who may serve
as liquidator, and appointment of the incumbent manager as the liquidator has
reportedly been quite common. Creditors have means to influence the process.
Nevertheless,  they may prefer Article 19 liquidation to bankruptcy because the costs of
realizing collateral are lower and because liquidation affords an opportunity to
neutralize the superpriority of state claims.
The Process in Action
Liquidation under Article 19 has been widely used in Poland since 1990, with
almost 1400 firms having entered the process and about 57 percent of these having
completed it or been moved  inlto  bankruptcy (Table 8).  Data on 853 cases filed in 1990-
1992 indicate that about three-fourtlhs  of the cases are relatively small firms (under 200
employees), and only 9 percent are relatively large (over 500 employees). 36
Table 10: Liquidations started and completed between 1990 and 199537
Year  Petitions  Refused  Accepted  Liquidations  Filings for
completed  bankruptcy
1990  58  0  20  0  0
1991  538  24  512  22  18
1992  314  15  322  80  127
1993  237  13  228  108  143
1994  160  4  155  101  25jo
1995  60  4  52  21  [128]"
Total  1367  60  1289  332  441l
36  Groszek  and Ciesla, 1993.
37 Meller, 1996,  citing  data from  the Ministry  of Privatisation.
38 By September  1994.
39 By inference  for the period October 1994  to end 1995.25
As can be seen from Table 10, the number of petitions for liquidation per year has
been declining since 1991. This probably reflects both the turnaround in the Polish
economy and the likelihood that the worst firms have already exited.  However, the
number of liquidations converting to bankruptcy has been quite steady.  This could
signal a realization by liquidators that some firms that filed for liquidation have
insufficient assets to cover their debts; alternatively, in the absence of careful oversight
by creditors, liquidators or managers could conceivably divert some assets of firms in
liquidation to new owners, leaving state entities to enter bankruptcy with debts but few
assets.
Although the number of new petitions is falling and the number converting to
bankruptcies is steady, the backlog of unfinished cases has grown every year. At the
beginning of 1996 almost 600 open cases -- already in process over 2 years on average --
still remained to be resolved.
Three  previous surveys -- covering 124",  2642,  and 2243  firms, respectively --
looked at the liquidation process in action.  The first two looked primarily at what
happened to the assets of liquidated firms.  They found that most assets were sold, if
possible at auction. Moveables were quite easy to sell, real estate much harder.  Although
discounts were often large, many of the assets were eventually put to use in new private
firms, and may employees were able to keep their jobs with the new owners.  Creditors
were likely to be the major losers in the process.  No clear schedule existed in most cases
for satisfying debt claims, and many irregularities occurred -- aggravated by the fact that
liquidators were in most cases the managers themselves.
The third survey, of 22 firms, looked at a sample of liquidations of relatively
small Warsaw-area firms.  In contrast with the earlier studies, this survey found few
examples of liquidators having a prior relationship with the company. 44 Creditors did not
initiate the liquidation in a single case; all cases were initiated by the founding body or
company management.  In stark contrast to our results (see below), creditors were fully
satisfied in 15 of the 22 cases in this survey.  It is possible that the outcomes of these 22
cases were significantly better than average outcomes from liquidation in the country as a
whole.  Not only were all 22 in the Warsaw area (where the administrative infrastructure
for liquidation is better), but most companies were service rather than manufacturing
firms and were relatively small (with 68 employees on average).  We doubt that the
40 Blaszczyk, 1995.
41  Research by J.M. Dobrowski, M. Federowicz and J. Szomburg for the Gdansk Institute for Market
Economics, discussed in Groszek/Ciesla, 1993.
42  Groszek and Ciesla, 1993.
43  Meller, 1996.
44  The phenomenon of the manager being appointed liquidator may have been more common in 1991 and
1992 than in later years.26
conclusions of this prior study -- that liquidation is a better option for creditors than
bankruptcy -- apply in the country as a whole.
Our sample includes 12 cases of state enterprise liquidation.  With average
operating losses of over 60 percent in 1991 and 1992, these firms were in worse financial
situation than firms in any other resolution path. They were also the first to be dealt with.
Liquidations began on average in July, 1992,45  more than 8 months before the average
starting date of bankruptcy cases and about 1 1/2 years before the average start of bank
conciliation cases.  Despite their terrible condition, the enterprises entering liquidation
had seen very little pressure from creditors.  Only one-sixth had been subject to any debt
collection action prior to the beginning of liquidation -- a far lower proportion than firms
in other resolution paths.  Perhaps this is explained by their early starting date, as creditor
passivity was most marked in the beginning years of transition.
Our sample confirms that liquidation is a debtor-driven process.  Of the twelve
cases in our sample, managers of the debtor firm filed the petition for liquidation in eight
cases, the workers' council of the debtor firm in three, and the "founding body" in one.
Although respondents reported various reasons for filing for liquidation rather than
bankruptcy (Table I 1), none of the 12 firms was fully servicing its debts at the time of
filing.  This, together with the small role played by the founding body in initiating cases,
strongly suggests that liquidation has in practice been an alternative mechanism to deal
with insolvent companies rather than what it was originally intended to be -- a means for
the state to close solvent state enterprises.
Table 11: Reason for placing rirm in liquidation rather than bankruptcy
-number of cases
Reason  Most  One of the
important  three most
reason  important
Firm was servicing all its debts  in no case  in no case
Firm had high net assets  2  4
Creditors expected to receive more under liquidation  2  6
Creditors wanted to restructure firm  2  6
Management wanted to restructure firm  3  6
Other  2  2
Our survey reinforces the conclusion of earlier studies that creditors have no real
influence over the process.  Liquidators were appointed quickly, on average three days
after liquidation proceedings began. In three-fourths of all cases the debtor chose the
liquidator.  In the remaining firms the founding body controlled the selection. In no case
did creditors influence the choice of liquidator.
45  The  earliest  liquidation  filing  in our  sample  was  in June  1991,  and  the  latest  in January  1995.27
The liquidators in our sample were able to move much faster at the beginning of
the process than the trustees in our sample of bankruptcy cases, perhaps because
liquidators knew the companies better.  Liquidators filed a first report in 51 days on
average, more than a month faster than bankruptcy trustees. The first disposition of
assets occurred eight and a half weeks into the process, as compared to fifteen in
bankruptcy cases.  But the liquidation process then slowed down, and on average our
liquidation cases are expected to take longer to finish than our bankruptcy cases.  The five
completed cases in our sample took on average more than three years to complete. 46
Liquidators in the seven unfinished cases expect their companies to be in liquidation for
four years and eight months on average -- more than 50% longer than average bankruptcy
cases.  Why is the process in the end so slow?  Eleven of twelve liquidators cited the lack
of buyers for the assets, and six cited confusion in ownership rights, particularly of real
estate.  The compensation formula for liquidators may also play a role; because
compensation is on a flat-rate monthly basis and is not tied to revenues from asset
47 disposition, liquidators have little incentive to complete the process.
What happens in the interim?  Four-fifths of our firms (the same proportion as in
bankruptcy) continued to operate as going concerns after liquidation had begun, and one-
half were still in operation (far more than in the case of bankruptcy) when the firms were
surveyed in mid-1995 -- on average three years after filing.  From 1992 to 1994 sales had
fallen 49 percent in real terms in these firms, and operating profit (also after accounting
for inflation) had fallen by 11 percent.  Employment had fallen by 45 percent, but real
wages per employee for those still employed had risen by 76 percent.
Outcomes
Liquidation is in part a process of privatization, whether of firms as going
concerns or of their assets.  Liquidators tried to find buyers of parts of the firms as going
concerns in three-quarters of our cases.  It appears that nearly 40 percent of our firms'
fixed assets will survive as part of a going concern.  Insiders of the firms appear to be in
subsequent control of about 20 percent of the assets sold, leased or transferred by these
firms by mid-1995.  That is roughly twice the level of insider privatization as under
bankruptcy. As in bankruptcy, the majority of assets (64 percent) were subsequently
controlled by non-affiliated private parties.
While liquidation may be an important avenue for privatization, creditors are big
losers. They are recovering very little from liquidation in our sample of firms.
Liquidators expect gross revenue from asset disposition to equal on average 19 percent of
the value of assets in the opening balance sheet. But in eight of our twelve cases for
which data are available, liquidation expenses and severance payments are estimated at
46 The quickest  was a little  faster than two  years,  the longest  took four years almost  to the day.
In the prior study  of 22 Warsaw  cases,  liquidators  were paid on average  9 to 16  million  zloty per month,
a multiple  of what bankruptcy  trustees  typcially  receive.28
double this amount -- some 38 percent of opening book value.  Banks are expected to
recover only 6 percent of the value of their claims on average, 48 and suppliers only 3
percent (Table 12). In two-thirds of our cases bank creditors and suppliers are expected
to receive nothing.
Table 12: Schedule of creditor satisfaction in liquidation cases
(Percentage of claims satisfied)
Lowest creditor group at  Employees  Government  Social  Banks  Suppliers
least partially satisfied:  Security
Employees  N=3  93%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Social Security  N=1  100%  10%  0%  0%  0%
Government  N=4  100%  13%  11%  0%  0%
Banks  N=1  75%  12%  10%  12%  0%
Suppliers  N=2  100%  100%  100%  13%  15%
Average percentage of
claims satisfied  96%  25%  23%  7%  3%
In sum, while state enterprise liquidation is on paper a means for government
owners to close solvent companies, it appears in practice to be used more commonly as a
means for debtor management to bypass bankruptcy and maintain control over the
disposition of assets of insolvent firms.  Because it impedes the ability of creditors to
recover their debts, it undercuts the potentially important governance role that creditors
can play -- and do play in mature market economies -- over firms in financial distress.
Other Resolution Paths
The other two resolution paths taken by some firms in our sample are repayment
and sale of debt.  As noted earlier in Figure 2, firms in our sample that repaid their debt
or became current on debt service had on average over 1200 employees and zero profits
in 1991/92, while firms whose debt was sold were generally small and unprofitable (with
average profts of -18 percent).
Repayment
Twenty-two of the firms in our sample were classified as having either fully
repaid or become current on their debt to their lead bank.  When we took a closer look,
we found that 4 of these firms had in fact never been in arrears, 49 and thus only 18
48  If the average  bank creditor  recovers  6 percent  of outstanding  claims  four and a half years after  the
beginning  of the process,  the net present  value  of the creditor's  recovery  is 2.2 percent  of its face value  on
the day the liquidation  procedure  began.
These  three were presumably  included  in the base  portfolio  either by mistake  or to shore up the amount
of the recapitalization.29
actually fit the category (14 having repaid in full and 4 having become current on debt
service).  Some of these 18 firms repaid as early as 1992, others not until the summer of
1994. On average it took approximately 6 months to clear arrears, starting from the date
that payments to the lead bank were resumed. About 80 percent of the amounts repaid
went for  principal, 20 percent for interest.  Repayments were all in money rather than in
equity or assets.
While the lead bank was repaid in full, other creditors did not fare as well.  Of the
18 firms, four cleared no arrears to trade creditors and 11 cleared them only in part.  Five
cleared no arrears to government creditors, and nine cleared them only in part.
When asked how they obtained the funds that financed the repayment, five of the
18 firms cited new borrowings from banks or other creditors as the most important
source.  Although lead banks were not allowed by law to give new credit to firms with
debt in their base portfolios, other creditors were not legally barred from extending new
credit.  If this same ratio of 5:18 were to hold for all firms in the base portfolio, this
would imply that over 200 firms paid back old loans with new loans -- arguably not the
intention of the EBRP.  Two firms disposed of assets to pay back their loans, one
received cash support from government, and the other 7 cited operating profits (i.e.
retained eamings) as the most important source of funds for repayment.
The 18 firms that repaid were not only better than other firms in our sample at the
beginning of the process, but they have fared somewhat better since. Sales revenues rose
on average by 1 percent (in real terms) from 1992 to 1994, and operating profits rose 15
percent.  The level of outstanding debt dropped by 18 percent.  Employment in those
firms fell on average by 22 percent during those two years, and the average wage rose 68
percent.  This is the only resolution path in our sample with firms that report rising sales
and profits.30
Sale of Debt
In theory sale of debt is an interesting and innovative alternative to traditional
debt collection routes.  It allows banks to rid themselves of problem debt without
resorting to costly negotiations or judicial procedures, and to put it in the hands of finns
or individuals better able to deal with it. There are several hypothetical reasons why such
parties might want to purchase bad debt from banks.  First, they may be more willing or
able than banks to collect the debt.  Second, they may be customers of the debtor firm
who can use such debt to pay for goods and services. Third, they may wish to swap the
debt for equity and take control of the debtor firm.  Under any of these scenarios sale of
debt can increase financial discipline and improve corporate governance in debtor firms.
In practice, however, sale of debt was perhaps the least successful path of the
EBRP.  Banks had little incentive to sell their debt.  One reason involved taxes: the losses
on such sales (that is, the difference between book value and sale price) were not
deductible from income for tax purposes, while write-offs of debt under other forms of
restructuring were deductible.  Thus, a sale of debt for 40 percent of its book value (a
high price in such markets) would "cost" the bank as much as a 100 percent write-off of
bad debt.  Another disincentive was the strong aversion to debt sales by debtors; if the
bank thought any continuing relationship with the client was even a remote possibility,
they would find it difficult to take a step so disliked by the client.
Not only were the incentives of banks weak, but so were those of potential
purchasers.  Purchasers faced the same problems as banks with debt collection -- slow
judicial procedures and low legal priority under collateral and bankruptcy laws.  In
addition, the ability to use debt to pay for purchases from debtor firms was extremely
limited in practice; although debt could be sold without the consent of the debtor under
Polish law, the purchaser of the debt could not use it to pay for goods and services
provided by the debtor without the latter's consent. Finally, as noted earlier, the
automatic approval for debt-equity swaps envisioned under the EBRP was blocked in
practice by the Ministry of Privatisation, making it unlikely that purchasers could gain
control of debtor firms.
Our sample included ten cases of debt sale.  Only six were successful sales; the
other four were unsuccessful attempts. Although the motivations behind the successful
cases were not entirely clear, indications are that three were attempts (by employees or
competitors) to get control via debt-equity swaps, one involved a customer who wanted
to use the debt to pay for purchases from the debtor firm, one was a purchase of debt by
local government as a form of subsidy, and one was a buyback of debt at a discount by
the debtor itself (not allowed by law but difficult to stop in practice).  On average the
bank took three and one-half months to complete the sale and received 23 percent of the
face value of the debt (with a range from 7 to 59 percent in the six cases).  Our survey
and related interviews with banks and firms confirmed the view that debt sales are not yet
easy-to-use or widely-accepted alternatives to more conventional debt collection routes in
Poland.31
Summary and Conclusions
The Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program adopted by the Polish parliament
in early 1993 provided numerous avenues for banks to resolve their bad loan problems.
An earlier paper surveyed the innovative bank conciliation (i.e. workout) process.  This
paper has looked at three traditional "exit" processes -- court conciliation, bankruptcy,
and state enterprise liquidation, and has briefly touched upon debt repayment and sale of
debt as alternatives under the EBRP.
From a broad perspective, many aspects of the EBRP appear positive.  The
program was innovative in design and was seriously implemented without fraud or
corruption.  It was an important catalyst in spurring creditors to take action against bad
debtors, and there appears to have been rough economic logic in the division of firms
among resolution paths.  Better off and/or larger firms tended to repay their debt or enter
bank conciliation, while weaker and/or smaller firms tended to go into bankruptcy or
liquidation.
Looking in greater detail, the traditional exit processes appear to have worked, but
with many flaws.  Our sample of 10 court conciliation cases were concluded in about six
months on average -- about the same as the time required in our bank conciliation cases.
Firms in court conciliation received smaller debt write-offs but greater extensions in debt
maturity than firms in bank conciliation. On a net present value basis, the extent of debt
relief under the two processes looks similar.  In contrast to bank conciliation, the extent
of write-off in our court conciliation cases was positively correlated with two other
economic variables, the operating profitability of the firm and its level of indebtedness.
With regard to outcomes, the subsequent performance of firms in court conciliation did
not improve, and in 8 of 10 cases they continue to have problems servicing their debt. 50
Poland's bankruptcy and related legislation has major weaknesses in design and
implementation, most notably the low priority given to secured creditors, the institutional
weakness of the bankruptcy courts and related professions, and the difficulty that judges
and trustees have in identifying and curbing fraudulent behavior. Bankruptcy in
inevitably a slow process, and in our sample of 23 cases the process was expected to take
on average about 3 years.  Creditors have little involvement in the process (but still more
then in state enterprise liquidation).  They were expected to recover very little of their
original claims in our sample of cases (on average 17 and 7 percent for banks and
suppliers, respectively), but, again, still more than in state enterprise liquidation.
Although it is still early to judge outcomes, initial indications are that firms in bank conciliation may not
have seen much improvement either (Gray and Holle, 1996).32
Neither bankruptcy nor court conciliation as currently designed give creditors
sufficient control over firms in financial distress.5'  Both could work much better if
redesigned, however, and if supported by institutional development in the courts and
related professions and by better systems of collateral and debt collection more generally.
Court conciliation could be redesigned in several ways to increase flexibility.
Government claims could be included in the process. A lower majority could be required
for approval of a workout agreement -- not varying with the extent of debt write-offs
proposed.  All creditors could be allowed to vote (whether or not present). And more
financial and operational restructuring options could be available for inclusion in
restructuring agreements.  Creditors' rights under bankruptcy could be strengthened by
rearranging priorities to put secured creditors first, by reducing up-front fees, and by
giving courts and trustees greater powers and resources to uncover and punish fraudulent
transactions.  Any improvements in design need to be complemented, however, by strong
economic policies that give banks and other creditors powerful incentives to use these
debt collection mechanisms.
State enterprise liquidation is perhaps the most problematic of the three formal
processes.  It is almost entirely controlled by debtors.  In most cases debtor management
chooses the trustee -- and in some cases even serves as trustee.  In our sample of 12
cases, state enterprise liquidation is proving to be significantly slower than bankruptcy.
Firms continue in operation far longer than in the bankruptcy process, and more assets
eventually end up under the control of managers and employees of the original firm.  It
appears that the process, though on paper designed for solvent firms, is often used in
practice as a way to get around bankruptcy and keep debtor management in control of
assets for as long as possible.  Creditors are the big losers.  They have no power, and in
our sample of cases were expected to recover almost nothing (6 and 3 percent for banks
and suppliers, respectively).  The "loophole" of state enterprise liquidation needs to be
plugged if the other formal processes are to work as intended.  It should be strictly limited
to solvent firms. If this is not feasible, the process should arguably be eliminated
altogether because of the abuse it invites.
The EBRP included a nonbureaucratic market-based alternative to these formal
processes -- sale of debt. In practice, however, it appears to have played a very limited
role.  Few sales were attempted and even fewer concluded.  Tax disadvantages and debtor
antipathy appears to have undercut banks' incentives to sell, and the difficulty of using
debt to "pay" for purchases or swapping debt into equity appears to have undercut
potential purchasers'  incentives to buy.  While a secondary market for debt can in theory
be an effective and nonbureaucratic means to increase financial discipline in problem
firms, it will take some time -- and probably a change in tax and other rules -- to build
such a market in Poland.
Both appear more  successful  as avenues  to transfer  control  over  assets  to new, private  parties.33
The EBRP also allowed firms to repay or become current on debt and thereby
avoid other resolution paths.  A large number of firms (about 40 percent) did repay.  In
the 18 cases that repaid arrears of the 22 in that category in our sample (the other 4
having never been in arrears), almost 40 percent appear to have used retained earnings to
repay, while 28 percent appear to have borrowed new money to pay back old debt -- a
result not necessarily in accord with the goals of the EBRP.
When looking at the Polish experience, and that of Hungary and other transition
economies as well, 52 one could well argue that policymakers should focus on improving
traditional and broadly-applicable exit and workout processes rather than adding new
ones for selected subsets of firms.  The traditional processes -- formal and informal
workout processes and bankruptcy -- are needed in any case. Judges need not be heavily
involved in all aspects of these processes (and, in the case of workouts, more
decentralization is generally better), but some oversight by courts is arguably needed to
insure due process in the treatment of all parties.  Special alternatives for selected firms -
- whether bank conciliation in Poland, "debtor consolidation" in Hungary, or enterprise
"jails" elsewhere -- tend to suffer from the same general problem: they lead those firms to
expect lenient treatment and thereby create a moral hazard that may stall further
restructuring.  Our survey has buttressed our belief that Poland has neglected its
traditional processes, in part because of its emphasis on bank conciliation.  Now that bank
conciliation has expired as an option, it should shift its energies to improving these
fundamental tools of debt collection and corporate governance.
52 Gray,  Schlorke,  and Szanyi  (1996),  World  Bank (1996).34
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Annex 1:  Data used for bank categorization
Underlying  data:
Category  Equity as a  Change in equity  Bad loans as a  Change in bad
share of risk-  as a share of risk-  share of loan  loans as a share
weighted  weighted assets  portfolio  of loan portfolio
assets, 1993  5  1991 to 1993  1991  1991 to 1993
Bank 1  weak  -1.2%  -14,0%  31%  +13%
Bank 2  weak  -4.4%  -3.2%  high  large increase
Bank 3  weak/adequate  -6.6%  +2.6%  60%  -38%
Bank 4  adequate/strong  8.5%  +5.1%  41 %*  -4%*
Bank 5  strong  21.2%  +17.9%  41%  -13%
Bank 6  strong  strong  privatized  low  privatized
Bank 7  strong  6.6%  +8.3%  28%  -10%
Bank 8  strong  10%**  strongly positive  28%  -3%
Bank 9  strong  strong  privatized  17%  privatized
* Data not available for 1991; 1992 data used instead.
**Data not available for 1993; 1992 data used instead
Rankings:
Category  Equity as a  Change in  Bad loans as  Change in bad  Total
share of risk-  equity as a  a share of  loans as a share
weighted  share of risk-  loan portfolio  of loan
assets,  weighted assets  199156  portfolio
X_______  199354  1991 to l993_5  1991 to 1993"7
Bank I  weak  1  1  2  1  5
Bank 2  weak  1  1  1  1  4
Bank 3  weak/  1  2  1  3  7
adequate
Bank 4  adequate/  3  3  1  2  9
strong
Bank 5  strong  3  3  1  3  10
Bank 6  strong  3  3  3  3  12
Bank 7  strong  3  3  2  3  11
Bank 8  strong  3  3  2  2  10
Bank 9  strong  3  3  3  3  12
Excluding  recapitalization  bonds received  at the end  of 1993.
54Negative  = 1;  Positive  up to 10%  = 2;  Positive  of 10%  or more =3.
5Decrease  = 1; Increase  up to 5% = 2;  Increase  above 5% = 3.
56Over  40% = 1; 20-40%  = 2;  Below  20% = 3.
mIncrease  = 1;  Decrease  up to 10%  = 2;  Decrease  of 10%  or above  = 3.37
Annex 2:  Logistic Regression Results
A logistic regression was run to test the significance of operating profitability and
number of employees in explaining the resolution paths taken by the 139 firms in our
sample. The coefficients and their chi-square values are indicated below. The positive
coefficients for operating profit and number of employees for paths 1 and 2 indicate that
firms with higher operating profits or more employees are clearly more likely to repay or
enter bank conciliation than to "exit" via bankruptcy or state enterprise liquidation. The
high chi-square values and low P-values confirm that these two variables are highly
significant.  The chi-square and P values for path 3 are lower, indicating that there is not a
highly significant difference between the firms that enter court conciliation and those that
exit.  (The coefficient for operating profit has a P-value just over 10 percent, however,
making it marginally significant.)
Resolution Path:  Values relative to bankruptcy/liquidation
(chi-square, P-values in parentheses)
Repayment/  Bank  Cor
good clients  conciliation  conciliation
(relative to 1)  (relative to  1)  (relative to 1)
Intercept  -.77*  .05  -1.49*  *
(2.86, .091)  (.02, .895)  (6.08, .014)
Operating profit  5.75**  6.33**  2.95
(EBIT)  (10.81, .001)  (19.83, .000)  (2.70, .101)
Number of employees  .001*  .001**  .001
1992  (3.72, .054)  (6.55, .011)  (1.20, .273)
*  P-value less than 10 percent.
**P-value less than 2 percent.38
Annex 3:
Comparing  Poland's  Two Formal  Workout  Processes
Bank Conciliation  Court Conciliation
Legal basis  Law of February 3, 1993  Presidential Decree of October 24,
1934, as amended  in  1990
Valid until  March 18, 1996  indefinitely
Pertains to:  majority state-owned companies  all businesses
Application made by:  Debtor  Debtor
Application made to:  Bank holding at least 20% of the debt of  District Court of the debtor
the debtor; 10% if that debt is larger than
one  billion  old zloties
Liabilities excluded  social insurance (ZUS), wage claims,  all those excluded in bank
personal withholding taxes payable by  conciliation plus taxes, fines and fees
firm,  secured  creditors  to government  authorities
Secured creditors  can either take part in agreement or accept  same
security  in full satisfaction  of their  claim.
List of creditors in theory  Debtor  Debtor
put together by:
List of creditors in  Bank  Judge
practice put together by:
Restructuring Plan in  Debtor  Debtor
theory prepared by:
Restructuring Plan in  Bank  Unknown
practice prepared by:
Debt-equity swap  encouraged  allowed
Voting  all creditors, whether at meeting or not  all creditors at meeting, minimum
50% for quorum
Required majority  Creditors with 50% of claims; tax office  Creditors with two-thirds of claims,
has to vote with lead bank  or four-fifths if write-off larger than
40%
Effectiveness  After signature from Ministry of  After court approval
Privatization
Supervision by  Creditors' council  Trustee
chosen by:  Creditors' assembly  Creditors' assembly
In case of non-compliance  Bank can either reimburse other creditors  A creditor or the trustee can apply to
for their losses or apply to court for  the court, which can then hold a trial
I agreement  to be unwound  to unwind  the  agreement.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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